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Note 
 
Addressing the HIPAA-potamus Sized Gap in 
Wearable Technology Regulation 
Paige Papandrea 
  INTRODUCTION   
You wake up at 7:00 AM, half an hour late. You rush to get 
ready, first throwing on your Apple Watch1 and then showering. 
Your watch records your heart rate at 112 beats per minute and 
counts exactly seventeen steps from your bedroom to your bath-
room. You run to catch the bus at 7:30 AM—your watch tracks 
your location as you run exactly 0.3 miles to the bus stop. Your 
heart rate is 155 beats per minute, you ran exactly 600 steps to 
get there, and burned around twenty-two calories, all tracked by 
your watch. You sit down, also recorded on your watch. You ar-
rive at work at 8:00 AM, sprint up the three flights of stairs, and 
quickly sit at your desk. Your watch measures your heart rate at 
169 beats per minute, updates how many flights of stairs you 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. I owe thanks 
to many people for their roles in my Note’s publication. First and foremost, 
thank you to Professor Amy Monahan for the guidance and advice in writing 
my Note. I also owe a special thanks to Professor Christopher Soper for his men-
torship throughout law school and his willingness to be a much-needed listening 
ear during the Note-writing process. To the wonderful Minnesota Law Review 
editors and staff, especially those staff members who checked my numerous ci-
tations, thank you all for your hard work. Thank you to my father, Rick Papan-
drea, and Roger Strode for providing the physician’s and health care lawyer’s 
perspectives, respectively, on my Note topic. To Eric, Sam, Frances, Bryan, Co-
rissa, and Connor, thank you for being my rocks throughout law school. Finally, 
thank you to Cole, whose love and support over the past year undoubtedly made 
this a better Note. Copyright © 2019 by Paige Papandrea. 
 1. This section discusses the types of data collected by a hypothetical Ap-
ple Watch. These types of data include heart rate, steps, distance traveled by 
foot, calories burned, flights of stairs taken, time spent sitting, time spent stand-
ing, general activity level, exercise length and type, and GPS location. See Jo-
seph Keller, Apple Watch and Activity Tracking: Everything You Need to Know!, 
IMORE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.imore.com/apple-watch-and-activity 
-tracking-what-you-need-know [https://perma.cc/E2ZY-8KNL]. 
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have climbed in the Apple HealthKit,2 and records the precise 
moment you sat at your desk. Over the next nine hours of work, 
your watch records almost everything you do: when you sit, when 
you stand, how many steps you take to get your morning coffee, 
your every trip to the bathroom, the spike in your heart rate 
when your boss asks you to come into her office. After work, you 
complete a quick workout and the exact workout length, calories 
burned, steps taken, and minute-by-minute heart rate are rec-
orded by your watch.  
At the end of the day, your watch tells you your general ac-
tivity level, how many calories you burned (and how they were 
burned), and total time standing. You can also view your heart 
rate throughout the day, your total steps taken, and distance 
covered by foot. If you had a different type of wearable technol-
ogy, you may have recorded your blood pressure,3 monitored 
your insulin levels,4 or tracked your sleep patterns.5 Although 
this health information is similar to, and in many cases more 
personal than, information collected by doctors and certain types 
of insurers, it generally has no privacy or security protections 
under federal law.6 This leaves most wearable technology com-
panies free to impose weak data security measures and sell or 
 
 2. Apple’s HealthKit is an iOS platform that allows a wide range of fitness, 
health, and medical data to be shared across different Apple apps and devices. 
See Ryan Faas, Get to Know iOS 8: HealthKit and Apple’s New Health App, 
MACWORLD (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.macworld.com/article/2691952/get-to 
-know-ios-8-healthkit-and-apple-s-new-health-app.html [https://perma.cc/ 
KRM5-KFH4]. 
 3. See Hugh Langley, Fighting the Silent Killer: Blood Pressure Is Weara-
ble Tech’s Next Challenge, WAREABLE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.wareable 
.com/health-and-wellbeing/wearable-blood-pressure-tech-559 [https://perma.cc/ 
UU3A-3K9Q] (discussing different wearable technology devices that can moni-
tor blood pressure).  
 4. See Michael Sawh, The Holy Grail: What You Need to Know About 
Wearables and Glucose Monitoring, WAREABLE (June 18, 2019), https://www 
.wareable.com/health-and-wellbeing/wearables-glucose-monitoring-6476 
[https://perma.cc/2Y9C-25TG] (discussing devices like the Dexcom monitor, 
which pairs with Fitbits to help users manage diabetes). 
 5. See Conor Allison, Best Sleep Trackers: We Compare Fitbit, Wearable 
and Bedside Devices, WAREABLE (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.wareable.com/ 
health-and-wellbeing/best-sleep-trackers-and-monitors [https://perma.cc/9NS2 
-5AMF] (discussing different wearable technology that tracks users’ sleep pat-
terns and habits). 
 6. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the types of data from wearable 
technology that are currently protected by HIPAA. 
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share their users’ health information without legal liability. Sim-
ilarly, if they experience a data breach in which individuals’ 
health information is compromised, then wearable technology 
users have no right to a remedy.7  
Despite the significant risks posed by wearable technology, 
it remains wildly popular.8 It is also wildly unregulated,9 with a 
few limited exceptions, and no stranger to data breach and pri-
vacy controversies.10 Given the types of health information col-
lected by wearable technology, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, better known as HIPAA, appears 
to be the likeliest candidate for wearable technology regula-
tion.11 However, HIPAA’s rules on health information privacy 
and security currently only apply to “covered entities” such as 
physicians and insurance companies and their “business associ-
ates,”12 leaving the vast amounts of personal health information 
collected by wearable technology virtually unprotected.  
 
 7. Since the mid-2000s, the risk of data breaches has increased. See John 
Biglow, Note and Comment, It Stands to Reason: An Argument for Article III 
Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data Breach Litigation, 17 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 943, 943, 946 (2016) (stating that since 2005, 4789 pub-
licly-known data breaches resulted in 896,258,345 compromised records and 
that 781 of these breaches occurred in 2015 alone).  
 8. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the widespread use of wearable 
technology. 
 9. See, e.g., Nina Kostyukovsky, Regulating Wearable Devices in the 
Healthcare Sector, AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_esource/2014-2015/may/devices/ 
[https://perma.cc/NTT5Q6VK] (“Wearable device manufacturers are not ordi-
narily exposed to HIPAA liability, because they are not Covered Entities.”); 
Colin Lecher, The FDA Doesn’t Want to Regulate Wearables, and Device Makers 
Want to Keep It That Way, THE VERGE (June 24, 2015), https://www.theverge 
.com/2015/6/24/8836049/fda-regulation-health-trackers-wearables-fitbit 
[https://perma.cc/32WY-9TDF] (describing how the Food and Drug Administra-
tion will not regulate wearable technology). 
 10. Cf. Liz Sly, U.S. Soldiers Are Revealing Sensitive and Dangerous Infor-




ing how Fitbit use accidentally revealed the locations of military bases). 
 11. This Note will exclusively focus on the regulation of wearable technol-
ogy to protect users’ private health information. Regulation of wearable tech-
nology for purposes of device safety, device effectiveness, general user privacy, 
or other purposes are separate issues not covered in this Note. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.1 for a discussion of “covered entities” and “business 
associates.” 
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This Note argues that HIPAA’s existing framework, alt-
hough well suited for the protection of health data in its tradi-
tional forms, must be modernized to reflect the reality that per-
sonal health information is created, collected, stored, and 
transmitted by devices far-removed from the four walls of a doc-
tor’s office. Part I discusses HIPAA and its regulatory protec-
tions of health information, which are limited by its application 
to only “covered entities” and their “business associates.” It also 
outlines the current state and uses of wearable technology. Part 
II highlights pertinent issues with wearable technology, the 
massive gaps in HIPAA coverage of health information collected 
or transmitted by wearable technology, and the other laws and 
regulations that fail to cover it. Part III proposes expanding 
HIPAA’s definition of “covered entities” to include wearable tech-
nology companies, so that the health information collected and 
transmitted by wearable technology is adequately regulated and 
protected. It provides model language for this expansion and also 
addresses why other potential solutions, unrelated to HIPAA, 
are inadequate. 
I.  HIPAA AND THE EMERGENCE OF WEARABLE 
TECHNOLOGY   
Medical privacy is such a foundational aspect of the health 
care system that it was written into the Hippocratic Oath.13 Con-
gress recognized the importance of medical privacy when it 
passed HIPAA in 1996, citing the increased risks of unauthor-
ized disclosure of medical information posed by electronic com-
munication.14 What Congress did not contemplate, however, was 
the emergence of non-medical entities that collect, store, and 
transmit private medical information. This Part introduces 
HIPAA’s key regulatory components and wearable technology as 
one type of non-medical device that interacts with health infor-
mation. Section A outlines the limited application of HIPAA’s 
 
 13. MARGARET BRAZIER & EMMA CAVE, MEDICINE, PATIENTS AND THE LAW 
83 (5th ed. 2011) (“Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not 
in connection with it, I see or hear in the life of men, which ought not to be 
spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept 
secret.” (quoting the Hippocratic Oath)). 
 14. See Protecting Our Personal Health Information: Privacy in the Elec-
tronic Age: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 105th Cong. 
2–5 (1997) (statements of Sen. Bill Frist, Member, S. Comm. on Labor & Human 
Res., and Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.). 
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regulatory framework to traditional health care entities and the 
regulatory protections afforded to patients’ health information. 
Section B discusses the popularity of wearable technology, the 
types of health data it collects, and its user benefits. 
A. HIPAA, ITS LIMITED APPLICATION, AND ITS REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
Congress enacted HIPAA with the original purpose of im-
proving “the portability and continuity of health insurance.”15 
However, public concerns about health information privacy and 
rapidly developing electronic technology led Congress to incorpo-
rate provisions into HIPAA that allowed the Secretary of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate 
rules for health information privacy and security.16 HHS primar-
ily accomplished this goal by enacting the HIPAA “Privacy 
Rule,”17 the HIPAA “Security Rule,”18 the HIPAA “Enforcement 
Rule,”19 and the HIPAA “Breach Notification Rule.”20 However, 
the protections afforded by the HIPAA Privacy, Security, En-
forcement, and Breach Notification rules do not apply to all types 
or uses of health data. This Section discusses HIPAA’s limited 
application and its regulatory framework in turn below. 
 
 15. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 136. 
 16. Id. § 264; HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SER-
VICES (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/MQQ8-GTUX]. 
 17. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164); Stand-
ards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). 
 18. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 
20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164). 
 19. HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390 
(Feb. 16, 2006) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). 
 20. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). The 
Breach Notification Rule was included in a final rule promulgated by HHS that 
implemented a number of provisions in the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. Id.; Omnibus HIPAA Rulemak-
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1. HIPAA Only Extends Its Regulatory Protections to 
“Personal Health Information” Held by “Covered Entities” and 
Their “Business Associates” 
Although HIPAA may appear to protect all of an individual’s 
health information, the accompanying regulatory language lim-
its its protections to “protected health information” (PHI). 
Simply put, health information must be coupled with personal 
identifiers to constitute PHI and receive protection under 
HIPAA’s various regulatory rules.21 For example, “if [a] vital 
signs dataset includes [a personal identifier], then the entire da-
taset must be protected since it contains an identifier.”22 Per-
sonal identifiers include things such as names, biometric identi-
fiers, and “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic, 
or code.”23  
The protection and regulation of PHI by HIPAA only applies 
to “covered entities”24 and “business associates.”25 Covered enti-
ties include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health 
care providers who transmit “any health information in elec-
tronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this sub-
chapter.”26 These most commonly include individuals or entities 
such as doctors, clinics, pharmacies, and health insurance com-
panies.27 
 
 21. PHI consists of any individually identifiable health information trans-
mitted or maintained by covered entities and their business associates. 45 
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). Health information is any information, including ge-
netic information that regardless of form or medium, “[r]elates to the past, pre-
sent, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the pro-
vision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment 
for the provision of health care to an individual.” Id. If health information iden-
tifies the individual, or there is a reasonable basis to believe it could be used to 
do so, it is considered individually identifiable. Id. 
 22. HIPAA PHI: List of 18 Identifiers and Definition of PHI, U.C. BERKE-
LEY, https://cphs.berkeley.edu/hipaa/hipaa18.html [https://perma.cc/6YFA 
-RPL9]. 
 23. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2017). 
 24. Id. § 164.500(a) (“[T]he standards, requirements, and implementation 
specifications of this subpart apply to covered entities with respect to protected 
health information.”). 
 25. Id. § 160.102(b). 
 26. Id. § 160.103. 
 27. Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVICES (June 16, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
covered-entities/index.html [https://perma.cc/R9VP-WREJ]. 
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Business associates of covered entities are also under 
HIPAA’s purview when they interact with PHI.28 Business asso-
ciates are “a person or entity that performs certain functions or 
activities that involve the use or disclosure of [PHI] on behalf of, 
or provides services to, a covered entity.”29 HHS expanded the 
definition of “business associates” in 2013 to include subcontrac-
tors of business associates.30 Therefore, business associates of 
covered entities and subcontractors of business associates, those 
“to whom a business associate has delegated a function, activity, 
or service the business associate has agreed to perform for a cov-
ered entity or business associate,” are subject to HIPAA’s Pri-
vacy and Security Rule’s compliance obligations.31 
2. HIPAA’s Regulations that Protect Patient Health 
Information 
In response to the growing concerns surrounding health in-
formation privacy, HHS promulgated the HIPAA Privacy, Secu-
rity, Enforcement, and Breach Notification rules. These rules 
govern how covered entities and their business associates trans-
mit, maintain, use, and otherwise interact with PHI. This Sec-
tion describes the rules and their various protections in turn. 
 
 28. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(b) (2017). 
 29. Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (May 24, 
2019), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business 
-associates/index.html [https://perma.cc/65TK-Q9X9]. Business associates per-
form certain functions and activities for covered entities and provide certain 
services. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). These functions and activities include 
claims processing or administration; data analysis, processing or administra-
tion; utilization review; quality assurance; billing; benefit management; prac-
tice management; and repricing. Business Associates, supra. Business associ-
ates provide services that are legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data 
aggregation, management, administrative, accreditation, and financial. Id. 
 30. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg., 5566, 5573 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164); 
Final HIPAA Amendments Expand HIPAA Net: Business Associates Now Re-
quired to Enter Business Associate Agreements with Subcontractors, DUANE 
MORRIS (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/final_HIPAA_ 
amendments_expand_HIPAA_net_4724.html [https://perma.cc/ZXT7-CGXZ]. 
 31. Business Associates, supra note 29; see also Modifications to the HIPAA 
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573; DUANE MORRIS, su-
pra note 30.  
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a. The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s purpose includes “protect[ing] 
and enhanc[ing] the rights of consumers” with regards to their 
health information, improving the quality of U.S. health care by 
“restoring trust in the health care system,” and “improv[ing] the 
efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a 
national framework for health privacy protection.”32 The Privacy 
Rule safeguards any PHI that is held by a covered entity or busi-
ness associate33 and “define[s] and limit[s] the circumstances” in 
which PHI can be used or disclosed.34 This entitles individuals 
to certain rights concerning their PHI, such as the right to know 
who has received their records35 and to place restrictions on who 
can access their information.36 
Generally, PHI cannot be used or disclosed unless the Pri-
vacy Rule requires or permits it or the individual authorizes it.37 
The Privacy Rule requires disclosure only when the individual 
requests access to it or when HHS is investigating the entity’s 
HIPAA compliance.38 However, covered entities may use or dis-
close PHI without the individual’s authorization in circum-
stances ranging from “treatment, payment, [and] health care op-
erations” to “public health activities.”39 The Privacy Rule 
 
 32. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,463 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). 
 33. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). Generally, covered entities cannot release 
PHI without the patient’s prior authorization. Id. § 164.514. See supra 
Part I.A.1 for a discussion of “covered entities” and “business associates.” 
 34. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws 
-regulations/index.html [https://perma.cc/8K4H-JCGQ]. 
 35. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528. 
 36. Id. § 164.510. 
 37. Id. § 164.502(a). 
 38. Id. § 164.502(a)(2). Upon the individual’s request, covered entities must 
also provide an accounting of the disclosures of the individual’s PHI. Id. 
 39. Id. §§ 164.502(a)(1), .512(b). PHI may also be disclosed without an indi-
vidual’s authorization for the following reasons or situations: (1) “[t]o the indi-
vidual”; (2) “[i]ncident to a use or disclosure otherwise permitted or required”; 
(3) where the individual has the opportunity to agree or object; and (4) as part 
of a “limited data set” for research, public health, or health care operations pur-
poses. Id. §§ 164.502(a)(1), .510, .512(b), .514(e)(1). 
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expressly prohibits the sale of PHI40 or the use of PHI in mar-
keting41 without prior authorization. 
b. The HIPAA Security Rule 
The HIPAA Security Rule sets national standards for the 
protection of electronic health information42 and does so through 
its proscribed data security measures.43 Once the covered entity 
or business associate has a patient’s PHI, it must (1) “[e]nsure 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of the infor-
mation; (2) protect the information against “any reasonably an-
ticipated threats or hazards”; (3) protect against unpermitted or 
unnecessary “reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures” of the 
information; and (4) ensure its workforce is compliant with the 
Security Rule.44 
Aside from the aforementioned general requirements, the 
HIPAA Security Rule also requires covered entities and business 
associates to implement specific administrative, physical, and 
technical safeguards to protect the PHI.45 The HIPAA Security 
Rule specifically allows for flexibility in its implementation—
covered entities and business associates “may use any security 
measures that allow [it] to reasonably and appropriately imple-
ment the standards and implementation specifications.”46 This 
means “smaller and less complex operations can institute more 
 
 40. Id. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii). Any authorization “must state that the disclosure 
will result in remuneration to the covered entity.” Id. § 164.508(a)(4). 
 41. Id. § 164.508(a)(3). The HIPAA regulations define “marketing” as a 
“communication about a product or service that encourages recipients of the 
communication to purchase or use the product or service.” Id. § 164.501. How-
ever, this definition contains several notable exceptions. These include commu-
nications such as refill reminders, face-to-face communications, and communi-
cations regarding an individual’s treatment. Id. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(3). 
 42. Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 
20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164) (“The confidentiality of health 
information is threatened not only by the risk of improper access to stored in-
formation, but also by the risk of interception during electronic transmission of 
the information.”). 
 43. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306. 
 44. Id. § 164.306(a). 
 45. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF 
THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REG-
ULATED BY HIPAA 16 (2016), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non 
-covered_entities_report_june_17_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2K8-6Z83].  
 46. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b). 
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cost-conscious means to remain lawful under HIPAA and can 
change with new technologies.”47 
c. The HIPAA Enforcement Rule 
The HIPAA Enforcement Rule created enforcement mecha-
nisms for the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.48 Individuals 
may file complaints with the Secretary of HHS if they believe a 
covered entity or business associate isn’t complying with the 
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules.49 The Secretary investigates 
these complaints and may impose civil penalties against the vi-
olating entity.50 Criminal penalties can be imposed by the De-
partment of Justice for more egregious HIPAA violations.51 Most 
important to this Note is what the HIPAA Enforcement Rule 
does not contain: a private right of action for those whose PHI 
has been compromised.52 This limits patients’ and consumers’ 
federal remedies to merely filing complaints with the HHS Sec-
retary. While there is no federal private right of action under 
 
 47. Alexis Guadarrama, Comment, Mind the Gap: Addressing Gaps in 
HIPAA Coverage in the Mobile Health Apps Industry, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 
1008 (2017). 
 48. The HIPAA Enforcement Rule also sets out requirements and proce-
dures for compliance reviews, investigations, and hearings. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 160.308, .312–.314, .504–.552 (2017). These aspects of the Rule are less per-
tinent to this Note and are therefore omitted from the discussion of the HIPAA 
Enforcement Rule in Part I.A.2.c. 
 49. 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2017).  
 50. Id. §§ 160.400–.408.  
 51. Memorandum Op. for the Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. & the Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney Gen., 29 Op. O.L.C. 76, 76 
(2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/ 
2015/05/28/op-olc-v029-p0076.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C2W-927P]. Under this re-
cent DOJ guidance, any provider “who violates the privacy rule by knowingly 
using or obtaining individually identifiable health information or discloses it to 
someone else may be punished by a fine, prison time, or both.” Anne M. Murphy 
et al., Criminal Prosecution for Violating HIPAA: An Emerging Threat to Health 
Care Professionals, STAT (July 2, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/ 
02/criminal-prosecution-violating-hipaa/ [https://perma.cc/S5KB-BA37]. The vi-
olating individual only needs to have “knowledge of the facts that constitute the 
offense,” knowledge that their actions violate HIPAA is not required. Id. (quot-
ing the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel’s guidance to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services).  
 52. De Facto Private Right of Action Under HIPAA: Is Ohio Next?, THOMP-
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HIPAA, state private causes of actions are not preempted by 
HIPAA53 and at least ten states allow plaintiffs to use HIPAA as 
a standard of care in negligence claims brought under existing 
state privacy torts.54 
Since 2003, the HHS Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has “re-
ceived over 213,561 HIPAA complaints and has initiated over 
975 compliance reviews.”55 The OCR resolved 98% of the cases, 
the majority of which did not present a case for enforcement.56 
Only sixty-five cases resulted in settlement or imposition of civil 
monetary penalties by the OCR, totaling $102,681,582.57 As of 
July 31, 2018 the OCR has referred 760 cases to the DOJ for 
potential criminal HIPAA violations.58  
d. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule and Other Protections 
Under the HITECH Act 
In 2009, Congress passed the Health Information Technol-
ogy for Economic and Clinical Health Act (the HITECH Act), as 
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.59 The 
HITECH Act was “designed to promote the widespread adoption 
and use of health information technology,”60 but electronic 
health information privacy and security concerns drove HHS to 
 
 53. See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, 102 A.3d 32, 35 
(Conn. 2014). 
 54. See THOMPSON HINE, supra note 52. It is much more difficult, however, 
to use HIPAA as a standard of care in a negligence per se claim. See, e.g., Shel-
don v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (holding 
that HIPAA could not be used as the standard of care where there was no state 
tort for negligent process and the plaintiff’s claim was essentially that the de-
fendant violated HIPAA). 
 55. Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (July 
31, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance 
-enforcement/data/enforcement-highlights/index.html [https://perma.cc/MJ67 
-W68C]. 
 56. The OCR found no eligible case for enforcement in 133,637 of the 
210,131 completed cases. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 16 and 42 of the U.S. Code). 
 60. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg., 5566, 5568 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). 
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strengthen HIPAA provisions as well.61 In 2013, HHS an-
nounced a final omnibus rule, which amended HIPAA regula-
tions in accordance with the HITECH Act.62 The HITECH Act 
supplemented HIPAA’s existing health data protections by im-
plementing measures such as mandatory penalties for viola-
tions63 and breach notification requirements.64 
These breach notification requirements are better known as 
the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, which provides that in the 
event of a breach of unsecured health information, the responsi-
ble covered entity must notify all affected individuals.65 Large 
breaches may require the covered entity to inform the appropri-
ate media66 and the Secretary of HHS.67 
B. THE CURRENT STATE OF WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS 
USES AND BENEFITS 
Wearable technology has been popular for decades. How-
ever, the wearable technology discussed in this Note, such as fit-
ness trackers and watches, took off in the early 2010s.68 It did 
 
 61. Timothy Newman & Jennifer Kreick, The Impact of HIPAA (and Other 
Federal Law) on Wearable Technology, 18 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 429, 432 
(2015). 
 62. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164); Final 
HIPAA Amendments, supra note 30. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2012). 
 64. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(1) (2017). 
 65. Id. (“A covered entity shall, following the discovery of a breach of unse-
cured protected health information, notify each individual whose unsecured pro-
tected health information has been, or is reasonably believed by the covered 
entity to have been, accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed as a result of such 
breach.”). In cases of breaches involving business associates of covered entities, 
the business associate must notify the covered entity, who in turn must notify 
the affected individuals. Id. § 164.410. 
 66. Id. § 164.406 (“For a breach of unsecured protected health information 
involving more than 500 residents of a State or jurisdiction, a covered entity 
shall . . . notify prominent media outlets serving the State or jurisdiction.”). 
 67. Id. § 164.408 (stating that a covered entity shall notify the Secretary in 
breaches involving 500 or more individuals). 
 68. Many commentators dubbed 2014 the “Year of Wearable Technology” 
due to the immense popularity of devices made by companies such as Fitbit, 
Nike, Samsung, and Google. See, e.g., Ewan Spence, 2014 Will Be the Year of 
Wearable Technology, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2013, 11:43 AM), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/ewanspence/2013/11/02/2014-will-be-the-year-of-wearable 
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not take long for their popularity to explode: global sales of wear-
able technology reached 121 million units in 2018 and analysts 
predict this number will near 200 million by 2021.69 Interest in 
wearable technology is equally high—71% of those aged sixteen 
to twenty-four want wearable technology and 64% of global in-
ternet users “have worn a piece of wearable tech already or are 
‘keen to do so in the future.’”70 Wearable technology is predicted 
to become one of the globally best-selling consumer electronics 
products, behind only smartphones.71 
Today’s wearable technology specifically refers to devices 
that “incorporate[ ] smart sensors that measure the wearer’s 
personal data.”72 These devices track troves of personal infor-
mation, including heart rate, sleep patterns, calorie expenditure, 
blood pressure, and geolocational information and share this in-
formation with computers and smartphone devices.73 The latest 
version of the Apple Watch can even take an electrocardiogram 
(EKG),74 further blurring the line between wearable technology 
as a consumer good and wearable technology as a medical good. 
The EKG feature received clearance from the U.S. Food and 
 
-technology/#32132dcac466 [https://perma.cc/T4GS-MTB4]. 
 69. Rob Corder, Sales of Wearable Technology Rose to 121 Million Units in 
2018, WATCHPRO (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.watchpro.com/sales-of 
-wearable-technology-rose-to-121-million-units-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5RVP-2PP8]. 
 70. Victor Lipman, 71% of 16-to-24-Year-Olds Want ‘Wearable Tech.’ Why 




 71. Nyshka Chandran, It’s Confirmed: Wearables Are the ‘Next Big Thing,’ 
CNBC (Sept. 22, 2015, 7:28 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/22/after 
-smartphones-wearable-tech-poised-to-be-next-big-thing.html 
[https://perma.cc/CFU6-LDR6]. 
 72. Shivali Best, What Is Wearable Technology? Everything You Need To 
Know About the Popular Gadgets, MIRROR (May 3, 2018, 9:12 AM), https:// 
www.mirror.co.uk/tech/what-wearable-technology-everything-you-12461665 
[https://perma.cc/573B-JJ8B]. 
 73. See supra INTRODUCTION; see also Grant Arnow, Note, Apple Watch-ing 
You: Why Wearable Technology Should Be Federally Regulated, 49 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 607, 610 (2016). 
 74. Angela Chen, Why an Apple Watch with EKG Matters, THE VERGE 
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Drug Administration (FDA), allowing it to be used as a medical 
device.75  
While information such as data collected from the Apple 
Watch’s EKG feature or heart rate can easily be identified as in-
formation that would be considered PHI under HIPAA, even ge-
olocational information could constitute PHI in certain circum-
stances.76 For example, location data can reveal when and where 
users go to the doctor’s office, identifying at least the physician 
group visited, and even to the bathroom, indicating particular 
health problems.77 Because the user’s name and other personal 
information is stored on the wearable technology, this infor-
mation could represent PHI.78 
Personal benefits to wearable technology users include ac-
cess to personal health information and prompts to develop more 
healthy habits. Fitbit trackers count steps and allow users to 
compete with one another in challenges.79 Apple Watches pro-
vide hourly reminders to stand and targeted daily goals for ac-
tivity.80 Wearable technology that makes a “meaningful impact” 
on users’ behaviors is likely to be more popular amongst consum-
ers,81 and devices such as these can encourage habits that help 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. For a discussion of HIPAA’s definition of health information and PHI, 
see supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Alexandra Troiano, Note, Wearables and Personal Health Data: 
Putting a Premium on Your Privacy, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1715, 1731 (2017).  
 78. Under HIPAA, PHI consists of any personally identifiable health infor-
mation that, regardless of form or medium, “[r]elates to the past, present, or 
future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of 
health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the 
provision of health care to an individual.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). An indi-
vidual’s name is a “personal identifier” necessary to make health information 
PHI under HIPAA. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Fitbit Adventures, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/challenges/ 
adventures [https://perma.cc/P7TZ-HH2W] (describing how Fitbit users can en-
gage in daily or weekly challenges against other users). 
 80. See Apple Watch Series 5: Ultimate Workout Partner, APPLE, https:// 
www.apple.com/apple-watch-series-5/workout/ [https://perma.cc/7U6Z-FUKK] 
(describing how the Apple Watch sets targeted goals for movement, exercise, 
and standing). 
 81. Cf. Endeavor Partners, Inside Wearables: How the Science of Human 
Behavior Change Offers the Secret to Long-Term Engagement, MEDIUM (Apr. 21, 
2017), https://medium.com/@endeavourprtnrs/inside-wearable-how-the-science 
-of-human-behavior-change-offers-the-secret-to-long-term-engagement 
-a15b3c7d4cf3 [https://perma.cc/N9HA-DNQN] (“Products and services that 
provide utility but fail to have a meaningful impact on users’ behaviors and 
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reduce premature mortality risks.82 These devices may have sig-
nificant medical benefits too. Widespread use of wearable tech-
nology will allow physicians to more regularly monitor their pa-
tients to provide increased quality of care83 and may reduce 
medical care costs.84  
II.  THE NEED FOR PROPER REGULATION OF 
WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY   
Although wearable technology provides numerous benefits, 
it remains essentially unregulated and leaves its users and the 
healthcare system vulnerable to harm. Wearable technology 
compromises users’ privacy and exposes them to higher risks of 
hacking. Currently, HIPAA can provide protection to wearable 
technology users in very limited circumstances, but this ex-
tremely narrow application creates a massive gap in health in-
formation protection. While HIPAA’s current language fails to 
cover PHI obtained from wearable technology in all circum-
stances, other laws and regulations do not regulate wearable 
technology and users’ PHI as well as an amended HIPAA would. 
This Part will address each of these issues in turn.  
A. PRIVACY ISSUES WITH WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS 
VULNERABILITY TO HACKING  
Wearable technology presents many privacy risks to con-
sumers, and by extension, the healthcare system. Users’ data is 
 
habits — such as an activity tracker that provides data but doesn’t inspire ac-
tion — end up failing in the market. Users quickly abandon wearables that don’t 
help them make positive changes.”). 
 82. See Alpa Patel et al., Leisure Time Spent Sitting in Relation to Total 
Mortality in a Prospective Cohort of US Adults, 172 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 419, 
419 (2010) (“There is a growing body of evidence showing that reducing the 
amount of time spent sitting [may relate] to total mortality . . . .”). 
 83. See Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1173, 1192–93 (2014) (“Patients and providers can then use this data to 
better tailor care, to better coordinate care . . . . Constant monitoring might give 
providers more lead-time to respond to life-threatening conditions, or even pre-
dict them ahead of time, and could reduce hospital readmission rates.”). 
 84. Id. at 1195 (explaining that mobile technologies, which include weara-
ble technology, can reduce costs “typically by preventing more acute, expensive 
episodes of care. For example, mobile technologies could reduce the number of 
hospital visits, physician visits, and other expensive face-to-face consulta-
tions. Mobile apps might also enable us to better manage chronic diseases, 
which account for roughly 75% of all U.S. health spending”). 
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extremely difficult to anonymize—meaning that even where in-
dividual identifiers are stripped from user data, users can almost 
always be identified.85 For example, if the wearable technology 
tracks users’ gaits, the user can “be 100 percent identified” be-
cause individual gaits are totally unique.86 Even without gait in-
formation, 95% of adults can be identified by their physical ac-
tivity data collected via wearable technology.87 Additionally, 
many types of wearable technology pair with mobile health and 
fitness applications, leaving users at risk of improper third-party 
data sharing.88 While HIPAA’s Privacy Rule prohibits the sale of 
PHI,89 equivalent personal health information collected or trans-
mitted by wearable technology can generally be sold without le-
gal consequences.90 This means wearable technology users also 
have no right to know how often and to whom their PHI was sold, 
leaving them unaware of how their privacy may be compromised. 
These privacy concerns are not limited to cheaper or less 
popular wearable technology—a 2015 study by HP found that all 
of the top ten most popular smartwatches contained “significant 
 




 86. Id. at 170–71 (“[T]he CIO of the CIA said you can be 100 percent iden-
tified, as an individual, by your Fitbit data. Why? Because no two persons’ gaits 
or ways of moving are the same. We can almost always figure out who you are 
based on that kind of incredibly rich detail.”). 
 87. Liangyuan Na et al., Feasibility of Reidentifying Individuals in Large 
National Physical Activity Data Sets from Which Protected Health Information 
Has Been Removed with Use of Machine Learning, J. AM. MED. ASS’N NETWORK 
OPEN 1, Dec. 21, 2018. 
 88. A 2014 FTC study of twelve mobile health and fitness applications 
found that user information was sent to seventy-six third-party companies with-
out user knowledge. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER GENERATED AND CON-
TROLLED HEALTH DATA (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_events/195411/consumer-health-data-webcast-slides.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/67CT-C8QT]. The improperly-shared information included device infor-
mation, consumer specific identities, unique device IDs capable of allowing third 
parties to track users’ devices across apps, and consumer information such as 
exercise and dietary habits and symptom searches. Id.  
 89. See supra Part I.A.2.a.  
 90. Wearable technology is generally not under HIPAA’s purview because 
wearable technology companies are not covered entities. See supra Part I.A.1. 
However, there are some circumstances in which wearable technology compa-
nies covered by HIPAA. See infra discussion of the “who provides it” and “lim-
ited voluntary compliance” HIPAA coverage gaps in Part II.B. 
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vulnerabilities” and presented privacy concerns.91 This study 
also highlighted wearable technology’s heightened risk of hack-
ing: all of the smartwatches used poor authentication methods 
and lacked proper encryption, but 70% of the watches lacked any 
encryption whatsoever for their firmware.92 This leaves users 
susceptible to security attacks such as “eavesdropping” and spy-
ware, data injection, phishing, and “brute force attack[s]” that 
can decipher user data and take control of the device.93 
Wearable technology’s vulnerability to hacking and the type 
of information it collects creates severe consequences for con-
sumers and providers in the healthcare system. Wearable tech-
nology collects many types of health information from its users, 
which is uniquely sensitive information as compared to other 
types of data at risk in high-profile data breaches.94 Apple’s new 
Health Records API, currently still in beta, lets users share their 
health record data, including “conditions, lab[] [results], medi-
cations” and more, with watchOS (Apple Watch) apps.95 Apple 
Watches and other similar devices are also prime targets of 
hackers because of electronic health record’s high black market 
value.96 If hackers obtain medical records or other personal in-
formation, they can misuse the user’s medical identity to obtain 
 
 91. HP Study Reveals Smartwatches Vulnerable to Attack, HP (July 22, 
2015), https://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=2037386# 
.Vi18G7crLIU [https://perma.cc/8D45-CCJE]. 
 92. Ke Wan Ching & Manmeet Mahinderjit Singh, Wearable Technology 
Devices Security and Privacy Vulnerability Analysis, 8 INT’L J. NETWORK SECU-
RITY & ITS APPLICATIONS 19, 22 & 22 fig.1 (2016). 
 93. Id. at 23 tbl.1. 
 94. While not all wearable technology would store personal health infor-
mation that could be used for medical identity theft, the Apple Watch now sup-
ports apps that allow you to access your medical records. iPhone Users Can View 
Their Health Records Through the Apple Health App, HIPAA J. (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.hipaajournal.com/iphone-users-can-view-health-records-apple 
-health-app/ [https://perma.cc/QHM4-R9M2]. Medical records contain infor-
mation that can be used in medical identity theft, which has more severe privacy 
and financial consequences than financial identity theft. See Claire Wilka, Note, 
The Effects of Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA: An Improper Tightening of the Re-
quirement for Article III Standing in Medical Data Breach Litigation, 49 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 467, 484 (2016). 
 95. HealthKit, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/healthkit/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3AC9-3NN7]. 
 96. How Wearables Could Put Doctors in HIPAA Hot Water, MDLINX: PHY-
SICIAN SENSE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.mdlinx.com/internal-medicine/ 
article/3586 [https://perma.cc/B3UV-CPJ9]. 
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medical care.97 Aside from the financial consequences of medical 
identity theft,98 it can also result in improper medical care as 
“[t]he thief’s own medical treatment, history, and diagnoses can 
get mixed up with your own electronic health records . . . .”99 Un-
like financial identity theft, where credit cards can be cancelled, 
“[b]iometric data such as fingerprints or eye scans, health infor-
mation, and genetic data cannot be exchanged.”100 Because 
wearable technology collects such health information, its vulner-
ability to hacking increases the likelihood for medical identity 
theft and the consequences thereof. 
B. HIPAA’S WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY DATA PROTECTION GAPS  
Most wearable technology and its associated applications 
fall outside of HIPAA’s scope. Wearable technology must be used 
or provided by a covered entity, such as a health care provider, 
and transmit PHI to fall under HIPAA.101 Therefore, when an 
individual purchases and uses wearable technology to manage 
their health, HIPAA does not apply; however, where a health 
care provider or insurer provides the individual with the device, 
 
 97. Wilka, supra note 94, at 476. 
 98. See Sam Draper, How Data Breach Is Inevitable in Wearable Devices, 
WEARABLE TECHS. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.wearable-technologies.com/2018/ 
10/how-data-breach-is-inevitable-in-wearable-devices/ [https://perma.cc/X2SC 
-23CJ] (describing how medical identity theft can lead to increased health in-
surance costs or even policy cancellation). 
 99. Michelle Andrews, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft, CONSUMER REP. 
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/medical-identity-theft/ 
medical-identity-theft/ [https://perma.cc/XK4J-ER5M] (“About 20 percent of vic-
tims have told us that they got the wrong diagnosis or treatment, or that their 
care was delayed because there was confusion about what was true in their rec-
ords due to the identity theft . . . .”). 
 100. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory 
of Data-Breach Harm, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 757–58 (2018). 
 101. Compare Adam H. Greene, When HIPAA Applies to Mobile Applica-
tions, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (June 16, 2011, 3:15 AM), https://www 
.mobihealthnews.com/11261/when-hipaa-applies-to-mobile-applications 
[https://perma.cc/MB6D-AGVB] (“An application that assists a physician with 
following up with patients would need to be designed to allow the physician to 
comply with HIPAA.”), with id. (stating that an application that allowed indi-
viduals to track their medication schedules and send their information to their 
physician would not fall under HIPAA because there is no covered entity in-
volved). Greene’s article deals exclusively with mobile applications that track 
health data, but given the similarities and overlap between mobile applications 
and wearable technology, which collect larger amounts of personal health infor-
mation, the same reasoning would very likely apply.  
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the wearable technology must comply with HIPAA.102 This 
leaves massive gaps in HIPAA coverage of personal health infor-
mation.  
1. The “Who Provides It” HIPAA Coverage Gap 
A large number of Americans use wearable technology,103 
which collects sensitive information ranging from daily activity 
to EKG results.104 While information like this would be covered 
under HIPAA if it was collected by a covered entity, technology 
designed for patient-use, independent of covered entity involve-
ment, is not affected by HIPAA.105 This Note will refer to this 
gap in HIPAA coverage as the “who provides it” gap.  
The “who provides it” gap is best illustrated by insurance 
programs such as those created by UnitedHealthcare.106 Unit-
edHealthcare’s Motion program is an employer-sponsored pro-
gram that allows employers to offer free or discounted wearable 
devices and insurance discounts to insured employees that track 
their exercise.107 Under the Motion program, employers can ei-
ther directly provide the wearable device to applicable employ-
ees, allow employees to sync their existing wearable devices to 
 
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 45, at 9. 
 103. A 2016 “digital health consumer adoption survey” conducted by Rock 
Health found that “[n]early a quarter of Americans own a wearable, up from 
12% in 2015.” Ashlee Adams et al., 50 Things We Now Know About Digital 
Health Consumers, ROCK HEALTH (2016), https://rockhealth.com/reports/ 
digital-health-consumer-adoption-2016/ [https://perma.cc/6GWN-QGMH]. 
Other recent studies have found that 33% of Americans use wearable technol-
ogy. Shelagh Dolan, The Wearables in US Healthcare Report: 3 Untapped Op-
portunities Wearables Present to Health Insurers, Providers, and Employers, 
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2018, 9:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/9-30 
-2018-wearables-in-healthcare-b-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/UXY6-PEE7]. 
 104. See, e.g., Arnow, supra note 73; Chen, supra note 74. 
 105. Scott Rupp, App Association Requests Clarity on HIPAA Regulations for 
Mobile App Developers, NUEMD (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.nuemd.com/news/ 
2014/10/02/app-association-requests-clarity-hipaa-regulations-mobile-app 
-developers [https://perma.cc/X3E4-KYD3]. 
 106. N.L., Will Wearable Devices Make Us Healthier?. ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 
2019), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2019/01/02/will 
-wearable-devices-make-us-healthier [https://perma.cc/LDK4-3N7Q]. 
 107. Caroline Hroncich, Fitbit Offers New Wearables to UnitedHealthcare 
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the program, or provide discounted wearable devices to employ-
ees who reach certain fitness goals.108 Generally, insurance com-
panies financially benefit from having healthier insureds, as the 
costs for their health care decrease. The Motion program has 
been very popular with insureds: 45–65% of those eligible to par-
ticipate in the program registered to do so.109 Other insurers, 
such as Blue Cross Blue Shield, Humana, and Aetna, have of-
fered similar incentives to policyholders.110  
Where a covered entity like UnitedHealthcare (or its related 
employer-sponsored health plans) provides users with wearable 
technology, two distinct issues with the “who provides it” gap are 
exposed. First, where wearable technology is provided by insur-
ers, HIPAA applies because insurers are one type of covered en-
tity. However, HIPAA will not apply to the same types of wear-
able technology if the consumer directly purchases it. This is the 
surface level issue in the “who provides it” gap.  
Second, even where HIPAA applies because the wearable 
technology was provided by insurers, there is still an alarming 
gap in HIPAA coverage. HIPAA may only apply to the insurers, 
because they fall under the definition of covered entities, and not 
to the wearable technology companies. This means that the data 
collected from the Fitbits and Apple Watches in UnitedH-
ealthcare’s Motion program must be used, stored, and transmit-
ted by UnitedHealthcare in a HIPAA-compliant fashion. How-
ever, the same data collected from these devices is not protected 
under HIPAA while it is collected, used, stored, or transmitted 
by the wearable technology company unless that company has 
 
 108. Id.; Michael Potuck, Promotion to Earn Free Apple Watch with Unit-
edHealthcare Rolling Out to All Eligible Customers, 9 TO 5 MAC (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://9to5mac.com/2018/11/14/free-apple-watch-with-unitedhealthcare/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CJU-XMER]; UnitedHealthcare Motion, 
UNITEDHEALTHCARE, https://www.uhc.com/employer/programs-tools/ 
unitedhealthcare-motion [https://perma.cc/6GZS-UYLX]. 
 109. UnitedHealthcare Motion, supra note 108. 
 110. Diana Manos, Health Plans Take Steps to Study Use of Fitness Weara-
bles, Data, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www 
.healthdatamanagement.com/news/health-plans-take-steps-to-study-use-of 
-fitness-wearables-data [https://perma.cc/U94W-WU47]; N.L., supra note 106; 
Johanna Mischke, Why Insurance Firms Increasingly Embracing Wearable De-
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signed a “Business Associate Agreement” with the insurer.111 
Simply put, in the absence of a Business Associate Agreement, 
the data is subject to HIPAA when the insurer has it, but not 
while the wearable technology collects it. 
Companies can easily exploit the “who provides it” gap, as 
Apple did with its Apple Watches in UnitedHealthcare’s Motion 
program. A subtle but important distinction between how the 
Motion program uses Fitbit devices and how it uses Apple Watch 
devices illustrates this point: UnitedHealthcare can provide the 
Fitbits to their insureds, but it merely discounts its policyhold-
ers’ purchase of an Apple Watch. Because UnitedHealthcare can 
provide the relevant Fitbits for free, and Fitbit likely signed 
Business Associate Agreements with UnitedHealthcare,112 the 
Motion Fitbit users’ PHI is protected while in both UnitedHeal-
care’s and Fitbit’s custody. However, Motion Apple Watch users 
either order their device (through the Motion program) for an 
initial discounted price and must meet certain exercise goals 
each month in order to avoid paying additional monthly fees, or 
use their already-purchased Apple Watches.113 It also appears 
Apple has not signed any Business Associate Agreements with 
UnitedHealthcare.114 Therefore, it’s likely that only UnitedH-
ealthcare must meet HIPAA’s standards when handling the Mo-
tion Apple Watch users’ PHI,115 leaving Apple free from respon-
sibility. 
 
 111. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), .504(e) (2017).  
 112. As discussed infra in Part II.B.2, Fitbit has voluntarily become HIPAA 
compliant and therefore likely signed Business Associate Agreements for its 
dealings with UnitedHealthcare. 
 113. Potuck, supra note 108. 
 114. A thorough internet search revealed no evidence that Apple signed a 
Business Associate Agreement for its dealings with UnitedHealthcare. If Apple 
signed a Business Associate Agreement, this would very likely be huge public 
news, as it would draw Apple under HIPAA’s purview. 
 115. Given the lack of authority on the subject, it is uncertain whether 
merely providing a discounted purchase price, linked to its insurance program, 
would make UnitedHealthcare the “provider” of the devices. However, legal ex-
perts advise that covered entities “who have partnered with wearable [technol-
ogy] companies are responsible for protecting the privacy of patient data.” Cf. 
MDLINX: PHYSICIAN SENSE, supra note 96 (“If the physician is the one who rec-
ommends the wearable to the patient, or is facilitating or interfacing with the 
wearable company and is accessing the health data generated by the wearable, 
there is a HIPAA implication . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, it 
is highly likely that UnitedHealthcare must manage the Apple Watch data in 
accordance with HIPAA. However, the fact that the policyholders purchase their 
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 2. The “Limited Voluntary Compliance” HIPAA Coverage Gap 
Wearable technology companies are clearly not a covered en-
tity under the current HIPAA definition.116 However, they can 
become subject to HIPAA regulations if they voluntarily upgrade 
their data security and privacy programs, so as to become 
HIPAA compliant, and work as business associates of certain 
covered entities.117 Business associates are subject to the same 
HIPAA regulations as covered entities.118 Wearable technology 
companies are voluntarily upgrading their data security 
measures to become HIPAA compliant, so that they may work 
directly with covered entities who want to use their products.119 
Despite voluntary compliance with HIPAA, HIPAA regulatory 
scheme will only apply to the wearable technology subject to 
those specific business associate agreements. This Note will re-
fer to this gap in HIPAA coverage as the “limited voluntary com-
pliance” gap.  
The “limited voluntary compliance” gap is best illustrated 
by recent changes at Fitbit. In 2015, Fitbit announced its HIPAA 
compliance program, which upgraded their data privacy and se-
curity measures.120 This allowed its “Fitbit Wellness” program to 
work more closely with HIPAA covered entities, such as health 
plans and self-insured employers, because it could now enter into 
Business Associate Agreements with those covered entities.121 
The Fitbit devices covered under these Business Associate 
 
Apple Watch devices appears to have allowed Apple to evade entering into a 
Business Associate Agreement, keeping Apple outside of HIPAA’s purview. 
 116. Covered entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and 
health care providers who transmit “any health information in electronic form 
in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.” 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.103 (2017).  
 117. See Fred Donovan, How Does HIPAA Apply to Wearable Health Tech-
nology?, HEALTH IT SECURITY (July 24, 2018), https://healthitsecurity.com/ 
news/how-does-hipaa-apply-to-wearable-health-technology [https://perma.cc/ 
FU9X-8ZFF] (discussing how wearable technology makers such as Fitbit are 
voluntarily upgrading their platforms to ensure their wearable technology is 
HIPAA compliant). 
 118. See supra the discussion of “business associates” in Part I.A.1. 
 119. Donovan, supra note 117. 
 120. Fitbit Extends Corporate Wellness Offering with HIPAA Compliant Ca-
pabilities, FITBIT (Sept. 16, 2015), https://investor.fitbit.com/press/press 
-releases/press-release-details/2015/fitbit-extends-corporate-wellness-offering-
with-hipaa-compliant-capabilities/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/B89W-Q5XP]. 
 121. Id. 
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Agreements will be regulated by HIPAA, but the millions of Fit-
bit devices bought directly by consumers for personal use will be 
outside of HIPAA’s protection and regulation. 
While Fitbit appears to be the only wearable technology 
company that is voluntarily HIPAA compliant, other companies 
have started to move in that direction. Apple has yet to upgrade 
its Apple Watch platform to be entirely HIPAA compliant or en-
ter into Business Associate Agreements with covered entities, 
but it has made several newsworthy steps towards HIPAA com-
pliance.122 The Apple Watch uses “HealthKit,” its health infor-
mation software, to ensure the user’s personal health infor-
mation is shared securely123 and has been recently updated to 
include a section that “allows users to view their medical records 
directly on their iPhones.”124 Apple Watches also have a third-
party app called “AirStrip” that allows users to directly send 
their HIPAA-compliant data to physicians.125 Voluntary HIPAA 
compliance, or steps towards it as in Apple’s case, does not en-
sure that all users of wearable technology will be protected un-
der HIPAA. However, it does suggest that wearable technology 
companies are aware of the nature of the personal health infor-
mation they collect and may be anticipating future regulation. 
 
 122. It should be noted that Apple has explicitly stated that its iCloud soft-
ware cannot be used by covered entities or business associates to store PHI. See 
Is iCloud HIPAA Compliant?, HIPAA J. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www 
.hipaajournal.com/icloud-hipaa-compliant/ [https://perma.cc/EGA6-Y5ZG] 
(stating that Apple includes in its Terms & Conditions for iCloud that “the use 
of iCloud by HIPAA-covered entities or their business associates for storing or 
sharing ePHI is not permitted, and that doing so would be a violation of HIPAA 
Rules”). However, this Note will focus exclusively on the Apple Watch in its dis-
cussion of wearable technology, and not Apple’s iCloud storage system. 
 123. Pamela Greenstone, HIPAA Guidelines Should Evolve with Wearable 
Technology, HILL (Mar. 14, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/378450 
-hipaa-guidelines-should-evolve-with-wearable-technology [https://perma.cc/ 
988U-XRJN]. 
 124. iPhone Users, supra note 94. This part of the Health app is “based on 
Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR)—a standard for transfer-
ring and sharing electronic medical records” and “[d]ata transmitted to the 
user’s iPhone is encrypted to prevent unauthorized access.” Id.  
 125. See Jacob Brogan, Apple’s Most Exciting New Design Feature? HIPAA 
Compliance., SLATE (Sept. 10, 2015), https://slate.com/technology/2015/09/ 
apple-s-and-airstrip-s-hipaa-compliant-features-were-the-most-exciting-part 
-of-its-latest-announcement.html [https://perma.cc/2NVR-LYMP]; Leigh 
Householder, HIPAA Compliant Data from the Apple Watch, SYNEOS HEALTH 
COMM. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://syneoshealthcommunications.com/blog/hipaa 
-compliant-data-from-the-apple-watch [https://perma.cc/5LSY-XT4Q]. 
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C. OTHER LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT 
WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY OR HEALTH DATA OBTAINED FROM 
THESE DEVICES ARE INADEQUATE 
HIPAA is one of several existing federal laws and regula-
tions that fail to regulate wearable technology or protect the data 
collected from wearable technology. But unlike HIPAA, which 
provides an appropriate regulatory structure that could provide 
complete protection of health information from wearable tech-
nology, other federal approaches could not properly protect con-
sumers from the risks presented by wearable technology. This 
Section will address these alternative federal approaches and 
why they are inadequate regulatory vehicles for wearable tech-
nology and the health information it collects.126  
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986 (ECPA) with the primary purpose of limiting what 
information can be disclosed to the government, but also to “pro-
tect[] individuals’ communications . . . from third parties with-
out legitimate authorization to access the messages.”127 Most 
pertinent to this Note, Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Commu-
nications Act (SCA),128 protects electronically stored communi-
cations and their contents.129 However, the ECPA and the SCA 
are severely outdated and “did not contemplate modern commu-
nication technology.”130  
 
 126. Given the vast range of possibilities that could be discussed, this Sec-
tion will only examine those approaches identified by other scholars. 
 127. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, UNIV. OF CIN.: OFFICE OF INFO. 
SECURITY, https://www.uc.edu/infosec/compliance/ecpa.html [https://perma.cc/ 
B8R8-4EBW]; see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C.).  
 128. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 129. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), JUST. INFO. 
SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1285 [https:// 
perma.cc/6Z2J-D8CM]. 
 130. Matthew R. Langley, Note, Hide Your Health: Addressing the New Pri-
vacy Problem of Consumer Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641, 1642–43 (2015). 
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As currently written, the ECPA and the SCA do not apply to 
wearable technology. The SCA limits when providers of an “elec-
tronic communication service”131 or a “remote computing ser-
vice”132 can voluntarily disclose customer information to com-
mercial third parties.133 The stringency of the disclosure laws 
depends on whether the communications are considered “con-
tent”134 or “noncontent,”135 as noncontent can be disclosed to any 
person other than the government without restriction.136 Though 
Congress designed the ECPA to regulate electronic communica-
tions as they existed in 1986, it is plausible that wearable tech-
nology could be considered providers of an electronic communi-
cation service and a remote computing service.137 However, 
 
 131. As defined in the SCA, an electronic communication service is “any ser-
vice which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or elec-
tronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 
 132. The SCA defines a remote computing service as “the provision to the 
public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic com-
munications system.” Id. § 2711(2). An electronic communications system is 
“any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical [sic] or photoelectronic facilities 
for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer 
facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such com-
munications.” Id. § 2510(14). 
 133. See id. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (stating that “a person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service [or a remote computing service] to the public 
shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communi-
cation while in electronic storage by that service” unless one of the listed excep-
tions under id. § 2702(b) applies). 
 134. Id. § 2510(8) (“[W]hen used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, [content] includes any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication.”). The disclosure rules for content 
are much stricter and do not allow for disclosure to nongovernmental third par-
ties. See id. § 2702(b). 
 135. Noncontent is not expressly defined in the ECPA or the SCA, but in-
cludes customer records and “information about the communication that the 
network uses to deliver and process the content information.” Orin S. Kerr, A 
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1228 (2004). 
 136. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).  
 137. For an analysis of how wearable technology could be considered to pro-
vide both an electronic communication service and a remote computing service, 
see Langley, supra note 130, at 1653–55 (“When an individual uses the Apple 
Watch to voluntarily communicate heart rate data to a friend, the health app is 
functioning as an electronic communication service; clearly this is an electronic 
communication, and the health app is providing the ability to send the 
user’s heart rate data to a friend. When the wearable is merely collecting heart 
rate data from the user, it is functioning as a remote computing service; the 
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health data from wearable technology would likely not be con-
sidered “content” under current case law because it generates 
automatically and is therefore not an “intended” communica-
tion.138 Therefore, wearable technology companies can disclose 
or sell customer health data to commercial third-parties without 
violating the SCA. 
2. FDA Regulations 
The FDA has jurisdiction to regulate medical “devices” un-
der the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.139 Medical devices 
are broadly defined to include “any product intended to diagnose, 
cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease, or any product intended 
to affect the structure or function of the body.”140 Under such 
broad language, wearable technology appears to be subject to the 
FDA’s jurisdiction because it can be used to “prevent disease” by 
encouraging healthy habits.141 However, the FDA focuses on a 
product’s “intended use,” as defined by the product’s manufac-
turer.142 FDA regulations define “intended use” as how the com-
pany marketing the devices objectively intended it to be used, 
including the claims made about the device.143 This allows wear-
able technology companies to avoid FDA regulation by labeling 
and marketing their devices as ones for personal use. Addition-
ally, 2016 FDA guidance states that the FDA will not regulate 
products so long as they are “intended for only general wellness 
use” and “low risk.”144 Wearable technology fits squarely within 
 
health app is available to anyone with a wearable, its main function is to track 
heart rate data, and it stores and processes data for the user.”). 
 138. See In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing that content “refers to the intended message conveyed by the communica-
tion, and does not include record information regarding the characteristics of 
the message that is generated in the course of the communication”); In re iPhone 
App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that geoloca-
tional information was not “content” under the SCA because it “generated auto-
matically, rather than through the intent of the user”). 
 139. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012)). 
 140. Cortez, supra note 83, at 1200–01 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012)). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Scott Danzis, FDA Proposes Amending the Definition of “Intended 
Use,” INSIDE MED. DEVICES (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www 
.insidemedicaldevices.com/2015/09/fda-proposes-amending-the-definition-of 
-intended-use/ [https://perma.cc/HBV3-GZP2]. 
 143. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2013). 
 144. FDA, GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES 2–5 (2016). 
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the category of low-risk general wellness products, and thus the 
FDA generally has not regulated these devices.145  
Clearly, neither the ECPA nor the FDA are appropriately 
equipped to regulate wearable technology and the health infor-
mation derived from it. Where these alternative federal ap-
proaches to wearable technology regulation fail, HIPAA has the 
potential to properly regulate wearable technology and protect 
consumers with minimal changes. 
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTION: EXPANDING THE 
DEFINITION OF HIPAA’S “COVERED ENTITIES” TO 
INCLUDE WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
WHOSE DEVICES INTERACT WITH PERSONAL HEALTH 
INFORMATION   
Wearable technology collects, stores, and transmits large 
amounts of personal health information in a more invasive man-
ner than that of health care providers.146 It is also vulnerable to 
hacking, putting users’ health information at significant risk.147 
HIPAA provides an existing framework for sensitive health in-
formation—a framework that already applies to wearable tech-
nology in select circumstances148—that could easily remedy 
these problems. Amending HIPAA to incorporate new technol-
ogy and adapt to the current age is very possible, as evidenced 
by the HITECH Act.149 This makes HIPAA the ideal regulatory 
 
General wellness products have intended uses that “relate to sustaining or of-
fering general improvement to functions associated with a general state of 
health,” regardless of whether they reference diseases or conditions. Id. at 3–4. 
Low-risk products are not invasive, do not require implantation, and do not “in-
volve an intervention or technology that may pose a risk to the safety of users 
and other persons if specific regulatory controls are not applied, such as risks 
from lasers or radiation exposure.” Id. at 5. 
 145. Though not explicitly mentioned in the guidance, wearable technology 
such as the Fitbit or Apple Watch would qualify as low-risk general wellness 
products because their intended uses relate to general health improvement and 
they are non-invasive external devices. Wearable technology is also extremely 
similar to the listed examples of low-risk general wellness devices, such as those 
that “monitor[ ]  and record[ ]  daily energy expenditure and cardiovascular 
workout activities” or “monitor the pulse rates of users during exercise . . . .” Id. 
at 6–7. 
 146. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  
 147. See supra Part II.A.  
 148. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 149. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
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mechanism for the health information derived from wearable 
technology. This Part proposes an amendment to HIPAA’s defi-
nition of “covered entities,” responds to the potential criticisms 
of this approach, and concludes by demonstrating why other pro-
posed solutions, unrelated to HIPAA, would be inadequate. 
A. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO HIPAA’S DEFINITION OF 
“COVERED ENTITIES”  
Amending the narrow definition of “covered entities” is the 
best approach to updating HIPAA to include wearable technol-
ogy. Currently, covered entities consist of health plans, health 
plan clearinghouses, and health care providers “who transmit[] 
any health information in electronic form in connection with a 
transaction covered by this subchapter.”150 To adequately accom-
modate wearable technology, the definition given in section 
160.103 and restated in section 160.102(b) should be amended 
by adding: 
(4) A company that manufactures wearable technology151 that tracks, 
collects, stores, or transmits any health information in electronic form. 
Except as otherwise provided, the standards, requirements, and imple-
mentation specifications adopted under this subchapter apply to only 
those wearable technology products that collect, store, or transmit 
health information and not to the other products manufactured by com-
panies under paragraph (4) of this definition.152  
 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5568 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164) 
(describing how Congress passed the HITECH Act thirteen years after passing 
HIPAA to update HIPAA and “promote the widespread adoption and interoper-
ability of health information technology”); see also HITECH Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 150. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102(b), .103 (2017). 
 151. Wearable technology would also have to be defined in HIPAA’s statu-
tory definitions, provided in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. This Note proposes a definition 
of “an electronic device that (1) can be worn on the body, (2) connects to the 
Internet, and (3) tracks, collects, stores, or transmits information about its 
user.” While this definition may appear broad, it is significantly limited by the 
proposed “covered entities” language in paragraph (4) that would limit HIPAA’s 
application to only those wearable technology companies whose devices interact 
with health information. 
 152. To ensure consistency, HIPAA’s definitions of “health information” and 
“individually identifiable health information” would also have to be amended to 
include “wearable technology company as defined in § 160.103.” For the current 
definitions of “health information” and “individually identifiable health infor-
mation,” see id. § 160.103. 
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Under the proposed language, companies that manufacture 
wearable technology will be covered entities and subject to 
HIPAA’s Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification rules. This 
definition includes wearable technology companies that exclu-
sively sell these devices, like Fitbit, and those that sell a variety 
of products, like Apple. In a mixed-products company like Apple, 
HIPAA regulatory requirements would only apply to its Apple 
Watch—Apple would not be required to update its unrelated ap-
plications and products that do not interact with personal health 
information. The proposed language should not take immediate 
effect, but rather take effect on a set compliance date that would 
allow wearable technology companies to develop and implement 
their respective HIPAA compliance programs. This is standard 
practice for HIPAA regulatory updates153 and will allow affected 
companies to strengthen their security and privacy measures 
without fear of punitive action by HHS. 
This Note is not the first to propose a “covered entities” ap-
proach to the wearable technology conundrum,154 but it is the 
first to provide a comprehensive and workable one. Another 
scholar suggests amending the definition of “covered entities” to 
include “companies that produce devices, a primary purpose of 
which is achieved through collecting health information from in-
dividuals.”155 This introduces an admittedly “unwieldy” primary 
purpose test that would require judicial intervention to interpret 
the definition.156 Not only would this be burdensome on HIPAA 
enforcement, it would be costly on both the government and 
wearable technology companies. It also would create a massive 
loophole ripe for exploitation: companies like Apple could merely 
 
 153. When the HHS final rule implementing stricter standards under the 
HITECH Act was passed, its compliance date was nearly six months after its 
effective date. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules Under the Heath Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566 (stating that the effective date of the final rule was 
March 26, 2013 and the compliance date for the applicable requirements was 
September 23, 2013). Given that this proposed regulation would draw an en-
tirely new industry into HIPAA’s regulatory purview, the compliance date 
would likely have to be further out than six months.  
 154. See, e.g., Arnow, supra note 73. 
 155. John T. Katuska, Note, Wearing Down HIPAA: How Wearable Technol-
ogies Erode Privacy Protections, 44 J. CORP. L. 385, 399 (2018). 
 156. Id. 
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argue their devices’ primary purpose is not collecting health in-
formation, or re-market their devices as such. Finally, it does not 
define the term “devices” and thus could require the entire com-
pany to become HIPAA compliant, including with respect to its 
devices that lack the trademark features (i.e. Internet-connect-
edness) and higher privacy and security needs of true wearable 
technology.157 This would significantly raise compliance costs for 
wearable technology companies, making them much more likely 
to object a possible definitional amendment of HIPAA’s “covered 
entities.”  
Amending the definition to “covered entities” is not the only 
possible HIPAA-based solution; some scholars have suggested 
amending the definition of “business associates” to include wear-
able technology companies whose products are used in conjunc-
tion with medical treatment or health insurance.158 This, how-
ever, would be unnecessarily complex. For example, following 
the “business associates” amendment approach would require 
covered entities like doctors to sign Business Associate Agree-
ments with wearable technology companies each time they “pre-
scribed” a wearable device to assist in medical treatment.159 This 
approach would also essentially replicate the HIPAA coverage 
gaps discussed in Part II.B.  
Conversely, this Note’s “covered entities” amendment ap-
proach would regulate all wearable technology that interacts 
with personal health information, eliminating the “who provides 
it” and “limited voluntary compliance” HIPAA coverage gaps.160 
It would provide uniform regulation for all wearable technology 
users and protect their invaluable health information. Wearable 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., Arnow, supra note 73, at 632–33. 
 159. Covered entities are required to enter into “Business Associate Agree-
ments,” or “business associate contracts,” with their business associates that 
handle PHI. See 45 C.F.R. 164.504(e) (2017). These agreements must meet sev-
eral requirements, such as defining the permitted uses and disclosures of PHI 
by the business associate. See Business Associate Contracts, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for 
-professionals/covered-entities/sample-business-associate-agreement 
-provisions/index.html [https://perma.cc/QAE5-G4ZT]. 
 160. For explanations of the “who provides it” and the “limited voluntary 
compliance” HIPAA coverage gaps, see supra Part II.B. 
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technology companies would be required to meet HIPAA data se-
curity standards,161 forcing them to remedy their devices’ signif-
icant vulnerabilities to hacking.162 Wearable technology users 
would also gain several more important protections: notification 
in the case of data breach,163 meaningful protection against un-
authorized sales of their health information and use of their 
health information for marketing purposes,164 and a right to an 
accounting of the disclosures of their PHI.165 
B. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THIS APPROACH  
The HIPAA “covered entities” approach represents the best 
and most realistic option for regulating the health information 
derived from wearable technology. However, it is not without its 
flaws. The potential criticisms of this approach would likely fall 
into two general categories: concerns that it would do too little 
for consumers and concerns that it would do too much to the 
wearable technology industry. This Section will respond to each 
of these categories in turn. 
The HIPAA “covered entities” approach could be criticized 
as inadequate for consumers for two reasons. First, it fails to pro-
tect users’ non-health information. Under this approach, a 
breach involving geolocational data would not be affected by 
HIPAA, and users would have little to no remedies.166 Though 
 
 161. See supra Part I.A.2.b. 
 162. For a discussion of wearable technology’s security vulnerabilities, see 
supra Part II.A. 
 163. See supra Part I.A.2.d. 
 164. See supra Part I.A.2.a. HIPAA’s protection against unauthorized disclo-
sure or use is especially meaningful in the wearable technology context. Author-
izations for the user or disclosure of PHI generally cannot be combined with any 
other document to create a “compound authorization”—effectively barring wear-
able technology companies from inserting broad authorization agreements into 
their terms of service or other fine-print agreements. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3) 
(2017). Additionally, the authorization must specify the purpose of the use or 
disclosure, who will have access to the information, and a definite expiration 
date for the authorization. Id. § 164.508(c)(1). All authorizations must be signed 
and dated by the individual and must use plain language, amongst many other 
stringent requirements. Id. § 164.508(c)(2). 
 165. See supra Part I.A.2.a. 
 166. Most states do not have a constitutional right to privacy that applies to 
non-governmental entities. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
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this is a serious issue, the exposure of health information pre-
sents the greatest risk to wearable technology users.167 Lawmak-
ers should regulate this information in a more urgent manner 
than non-health information, even if that means temporarily 
foregoing the regulation of non-health information.168 Second, 
this approach is limited to HIPAA’s remedies, which notably 
lacks a federal private enforcement right. While federal reme-
dies would be limited to filing a complaint with the HHS Secre-
tary, consumers in a limited number of states could attempt to 
sue wearable technology companies through private enforce-
ment at the state level.169 This would likely be limited to states 
who already have privacy torts that could encompass HIPAA vi-
olations, like torts for improper disclosures of medical infor-
mation.170 This is an incomplete and imperfect solution, but this 
issue cannot be remedied without a complete overhaul to 
HIPAA’s enforcement scheme, which is outside the scope of this 
Note. 
The HIPAA “covered entities” approach could also be viewed 
as a potential overregulation of wearable technology companies. 
This approach would bring an entirely new industry under 
HIPAA’s purview and subject them to new, rigorous privacy and 
security standards. The imposition of a new regulatory scheme 
could theoretically stifle industry innovation; however, this is ex-
tremely unlikely. Companies like Fitbit have demonstrated that 
HIPAA compliance is not only possible, it is profitable.171 Other 
 
 167. See supra Part II.A. 
 168. This approach also does not preclude other laws or regulations from 
regulating and protecting users’ non-health information collected by wearable 
technology. Electronic information privacy is a widespread issue that affects 
more than just wearable technology and would likely need to be regulated under 
a new federal law or agency. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 169. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 170. For the discussion of state private remedies for HIPAA violations, see 
supra Part I.A.2.c. Some states are going beyond HIPAA and proposing legisla-
tion that would treat personal health data like property. See Stephanie Condon, 
Oregon Lawmakers Roll Out Bill to Let Patients Get Paid for Health Data, 
ZDNET (Jan. 29, 2019, 7:42 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/oregon 
-lawmakers-roll-out-bill-to-let-patients-get-paid-for-health-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EP5-MLUS] (discussing the Health Information Property 
Act, which would, in part, “allow consumers to elect to receive payment in ex-
change for authorizing the de-identification of their PHI for purpose of sale”). 
 171. For the discussion of Fitbit’s voluntary HIPAA compliance, see supra 
Part II.B.2. 
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large wearable technology companies are very likely capable of 
HIPAA compliance.172 Even smaller wearable technology compa-
nies would not be over-burdened by this approach because the 
HIPAA Security Rule allows smaller companies to implement se-
curity measures appropriate for their size and budget.173 Addi-
tionally, HIPAA compliance offers lucrative business opportuni-
ties to wearable technology companies because it allows them to 
partner with traditional health care providers such as insurance 
companies.174 This approach could actually foster innovation in 
the wearable technology industry as wearable technology com-
panies can work more closely with health care providers to cre-
ate new types of devices. 
C. OTHER PROPOSED STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
APPROACHES TO REGULATING HEALTH INFORMATION 
COLLECTED BY WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE 
INADEQUATE  
Amending HIPAA is not the only proposed solution to the 
problem discussed in this Note. Other scholars have proposed 
amending the ECPA, adapting FDA regulations, and creating 
new federal agencies to better address wearable technology. 
State approaches, such as constitutional amendments and legis-
lative changes, have also been discussed. But unlike the pro-
posed amendment to HIPAA’s “covered entities,” other federal 
and state approaches could not properly protect consumers from 
 
 172. The estimated costs of HIPAA compliance vary based on organization 
size, and there is very little publicly available information on actual compliance 
costs. In its first twenty-eight months of HIPAA compliance, the Mayo Clinic’s 
HIPAA start-up costs were slightly over $4.6 million. See Arthur R. Williams et 
al., HIPAA Costs and Patient Perceptions of Privacy Safeguards at Mayo Clinic, 
34 JOINT COMMISSION ON QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 27, 30 tbl.2 (2008). Its 
annual HIPAA operating costs, for 2001–2003, were $1.27 million. Id. at 31. 
Mayo Clinic is an extremely large health care provider with annual revenues of 
nearly $12 billion, so it is likely that its HIPAA compliance costs are on the 
higher end. See Mayo Clinic Facts, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
about-mayo-clinic/facts-statistics [https://perma.cc/K8E9-ZKA2]. Assuming 
similar compliance costs for large wearable technology companies, it is also 
likely that they can afford both the start-up and annual operating costs of 
HIPAA compliance.  
 173. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 174. For the discussion of Fitbit’s voluntary HIPAA compliance, see supra 
Part II.B.2. 
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the risks to health information presented by wearable technol-
ogy. This Section will address each of these proposals and their 
inadequacies in turn. 
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
Some scholars suggest amending the SCA to include per-
sonal health data, which would require updating the current def-
inition of “content” and adding a definition for personal health 
data.175 This proposal, however, is utterly inadequate for several 
reasons. First, the ECPA and SCA primarily limit disclosures of 
electronic communications to the government but say very little 
about disclosures to commercial third parties. Currently, weara-
ble technology users face a greater risk of improper third-party 
disclosures to commercial parties than to governmental enti-
ties.176 Second, regulating wearable technology through the 
ECPA and SCA would only protect users against improper dis-
closures of their health information. It would not provide users 
with the right to know who has received their health infor-
mation, require wearable technology companies to meet security 
requirements for storing said information, or require companies 
to notify users of breaches that may affect them.177 Because 
health information is markedly more sensitive than the elec-
tronic communications protected by the ECPA and SCA, it 
should be regulated under a more comprehensive regulatory 
scheme designed to protect such sensitive information. 
2. FDA Regulations 
Hypothetically, the FDA could regulate wearable technology 
by amending its definition of “medical devices” to include wear-
able technology that collects health information or issuing guid-
ance that requires these devices to receive FDA approval. This 
seems unlikely, though, given the FDA is already administra-
tively overburdened178 and may not be capable of regulating an 
 
 175. See Langley, supra note 130, at 1658–59. 
 176. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 177. For additional examples of protections that would be provided under 
HIPAA, see supra Parts I.A.2.a–b, d. 
 178. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted 
Wound or the Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 
93 Cornell L. Rev. 981, 983 (2008) (“By 2001, if not before, the Agency did not 
have the necessary resources to fulfill its mission; it is the FDA’s resource defi-
cit, as much as regulatory capture, that is to blame for the string of regulatory 
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entirely new category of products. Even if the FDA was able to 
regulate wearable technology effectively, this regulation would 
only address the safety and effectiveness of wearable technology 
as medical devices.179 It would not address the privacy and secu-
rity of users’ sensitive health information, making it an incom-
plete and inadequate regulatory approach to wearable technol-
ogy that collects health information. 
3. Creation of a New Federal Agency 
Clearly, no federal law or regulation currently provides the 
level of regulation needed to protect consumers from the risks of 
wearable technology. Instead of updating existing laws or regu-
lations, some have suggested creating a new federal agency to 
regulate internet privacy and data security.180 While this would 
“align the current patchwork regulatory structure,”181 it appears 
unlikely that an increasingly inefficient Congress182 would cre-
ate a new agency and that agency would successfully avoid the 
same issues plaguing existing agencies that attempt to regulate 
wearable technology.183 Additionally, an agency whose purpose 
is to regulate internet privacy and data security may not be 
equipped to specifically regulate wearable technology for the 
 
failures that began then and have accelerated since. The FDA is chronically 
underfunded, overworked, incapable of effectively tackling the massive job Con-
gress assigned it, and bereft of the leadership needed to defend itself in the court 
of public opinion.”). 
 179. Is Your Product Regulated?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/ 
overview-device-regulation/your-product-regulated/ [https://perma.cc/2MSC 
-Q3BR] (“The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates medical de-
vices to assure their safety and effectiveness.”). For a list of the FDA’s basic 
regulatory requirements for medical devices, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 807, 812, 
814, 820 (2017). See also Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, https://www.fda 
.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/ 
overview-device-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/EP8N-4RV4].  
 180. See Arnow, supra note 73, at 630–31. 
 181. Id. at 630. 
 182. See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, Despite GOP Control of Congress and White 
House, Lawmaking Lagged in 2017, FINANCIAL (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www 
.finchannel.com/world/america/70777-despite-gop-control-of-congress-and 
-white-house-lawmaking-lagged-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/7EMF-ZJRM] (de-
scribing how the 115th Congress was the fourth least productive in the past 
thirty years). 
 183. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2014) (discussing how the FDA has long struggled to regu-
late continuously changing and disruptive technology). 
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risks it presents to users’ health information.184 In order to 
properly protect health information collected by wearable tech-
nology, this agency would essentially have to replicate HIPAA’s 
regulatory structure.185 But HIPAA already applies to wearable 
technology in certain circumstances,186 so any replication of 
health information regulation would be redundant and cause ju-
risdictional conflicts between HHS and the new agency. For 
these reasons, creating a new federal agency is not the best so-
lution to regulating wearable technology and the data it collects. 
4. State-Based Approaches 
Scholars have also proposed state-based solutions to regu-
lating health information from wearable technology.187 The first 
type of state-based solution is amending state constitutions to 
include a right to privacy. Few states include a right to privacy 
in their constitutions188 and they vary on whether that protec-
tion applies against nongovernmental entities.189 Those propos-
ing state constitutional amendments advocate for a constitu-
tional right to privacy that protects against intrusion by private 
parties, which would allow individuals to bring suit for violations 
to their constitutional right to privacy if their private health in-
formation was exposed.190 The second type of state-based solu-
tion is amending state health information legislation to protect 
 
 184. For a discussion of the sensitive nature of health information and the 
risks posed to consumers by medical identity theft, see supra Part II.A. 
 185. For a discussion of HIPAA’s key regulatory provisions, see supra Part 
I.A.2. 
 186. For an explanation of when HIPAA applies to wearable technology, see 
supra Part II.B. 
 187. See Steven Spann, Note, Wearable Fitness Devices: Personal Health 
Data Privacy in Washington State, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1411, 1426–32 (2016) 
(proposing changes to the Washington state constitution or state legislation). 
 188. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (amended 1972); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, 
§ 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12 (amended 1982), 23 
(amended 1998); HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7 (amended 1978); ILL. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 189. Compare State v. Hinton, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (Wash. 2014) (stating that the 
Washington state constitution’s right to privacy “protects citizens from govern-
mental intrusion into their private affairs without the authority of law”), with 
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he Pri-
vacy Initiative in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a 
right of action against private as well as government entities.”). 
 190. Spann, supra note 187, at 1428–30. 
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data derived from wearable technology.191 These state laws pro-
vide similar protection to HIPAA, but also face similar applica-
bility issues when it comes to wearable technology. Some state 
legislation would need significant overhaul before it could plau-
sibly apply to wearable technology,192 but other states have leg-
islation that could apply to wearable technology as is.193  
Amendments to state constitutions and to state legislation 
are both inadequate solutions to the problems posed by wearable 
technology. For instance, creating a right to privacy in state con-
stitutions only allows individuals to sue once that right has been 
violated. It does nothing to protect that private information—
other than to incidentally incentivize companies to better protect 
users’ data out of fear of being sued. Both state-based solutions 
would fail for another reason: massive inconsistency across the 
states. If states were to independently amend their constitutions 
and health information laws, the standards for wearable tech-
nology health data protection would greatly vary. This would 
harm wearable technology companies and their consumers. 
Wearable technology companies would have to create products 
that meet all of the varying requirements across the states.194 
Their customers would have different rights depending on where 
they live, unfairly allowing those with more comprehensive leg-
islative schemes to have more remedies for harm created by the 
same breach.  
 
 191. Id. at 1429–33. 
 192. Id. at 1429–30 (discussing the four definitional amendments to Wash-
ington’s Health Information Act that would need to be made to accommodate 
regulation of health information derived from wearable technology). 
 193. California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act applies more 
broadly than HIPAA, including to entities other than health care providers who 
maintain medical information. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(a) (West 2012). Texas’s 
Medical Records Privacy Act applies to “any person who . . . engages in the prac-
tice of assembling, collecting, analyzing, using, evaluating, storing, or transmit-
ting protected health information.” Medical Records Privacy Act, TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2) (West 2015). 
 194. It is possible, however, that inconsistent state laws would result in 
wearable technology companies adopting the standards required by the most 
stringent state(s). This would benefit consumers in terms of the data security 
and privacy measures enacted by the wearable company but would likely not 
affect variations in available remedies or data breach notification requirements. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Health information and medical records are now generated 
by a growing number of non-medical entities, including wearable 
technology. And wearable technology has unprecedented levels 
of access to its users’ health information—information, that if 
collected by doctor or insurance company, would be subject to 
extensive security and privacy regulations. Its lax security 
standards and constant collection of health information means 
that hackers have easy access to vastly more information than if 
they were to target a traditional health care entity. 
This Note advocates for equal regulation and protection of 
personal health information, regardless of how that information 
is initially collected. It proposes an expanded definition of “cov-
ered entities” to draw wearable technology companies into 
HIPAA’s regulatory purview, which provides uniform regulation 
of health information and closes the existing HIPAA coverage 
gaps for wearable technology. This proposal is not only a viable 
option, it is the best option for doing so. Medical privacy is one of 
the foundational pillars of the American health care system, but 
this pillar is cracked. HIPAA must be updated to reflect the mod-
ern reality of the health care system before it crumbles. 
 
